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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ARKANSAS
BALLOT QUESTION DISCLOSURE ACT
John M.A. DiPippa *
I. INTRODUCTION
Ballot initiatives and referenda were Progressive Era innovations
conceived to combat the influence of monied interests on the legisla-
tive process.' Because legislators were often perceived as being
"owned" by corporate interests, the initiative and referendum were
experiments in direct democracy designed to circumvent the corrup-
tion of backroom politics.2 Arkansas law allows both initiatives and
referenda.3 By far, the initiative is the most frequently used process.4
The use of ballot measures nationally is on the rise.5 The ballot
measure's increased popularity has caused renewed concern over the
effect of powerful interests on the process. One researcher found that
the financially dominant side won eleven out of fourteen ballot con-
tests studied.6 Some individual corporations spent in excess of one
million dollars in particular campaigns.7 In many instances, the side
which received a large amount of corporate support tried to hide this
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law.
B.A., West Chester University, J.D., Washington & Lee University School of Law.
I wish to thank John Burnett, who first brought this subject to my attention and whose
spirited defense of free speech spurred me on to further study, and the students enrolled in my
Spring 1990 First Amendment Seminar, whose insights allowed me to knit together my dis-
jointed thoughts. Of course, I accept responsibility for any mistakes of law, fact, or judgment.
1. Mickenberg, The Constitutionality of Limitations on Contributions to Ballot-Measure
Campaigns, 12 Sw. U.L. REv. 527, 545 (1981). For a collection of authorities, see Citizens
Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 310 (1981) (White, J., dissenting).
2. See generally D. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSI-
TIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1984).
3. ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22 (legislative referral of proposed constitutional amend-
ments to the people for approval); ARK. CONST. amend. 7 (enactment of legislative and consti-
tutional changes by the electoral processes of initiative and referendum).
4. Kennedy, Initiated Constitutional Amendments In Arkansas: Strolling Through the
Mine Field, 9 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1, 6-7 (1986-87). Professor Kennedy's article is the
most comprehensive treatment of the Arkansas law of initiated amendments.
5. Magleby, supra note 2, at app. C.
6. S. LYDENBERG, BANKROLLING BALLOTS, UPDATE 1980: THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN
FINANCING BALLOT QUESTION CAMPAIGNS 2.
7. In Missouri an electric utility spent $1.15 million to oppose a nuclear power initiative
while R.J. Reynolds Corp. spent $1.14 million to fight anti-smoking ordinances in California
and Florida. Id. at 4.
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support by the adoption of names that served to obscure the nature of
the group's financial backing. 8 Disclosure of corporate contributions
often occurred late in the campaign when the effect on voters' deci-
sion was negligible.9
Several states have responded to the threat that well-financed
campaigns could distort the ballot process by enacting laws designed
to restrict the amount of corporate contributions and to promote full
disclosure of a measure's supporters or opponents.' 0 Although com-
mentators have generally favored corporate contribution and expendi-
ture limitations, I courts have not. 12
In 1988 Arkansans were asked to vote on a number of ballot
questions. Two amendments attracted well-financed opposition.
Business groups filed court challenges to the "Ethics in Government
Act" and Amendment 4, the "Fair Tax Amendment."' 3 On October
12, 1988, the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected both challenges,
which cleared the way for placement of both propositions on the No-
vember ballot.14 Shortly thereafter, the Arkansas Gazette reported
8. For example, in anti-nuclear campaigns in Maine, Missouri, and Oregon, the opposi-
tion styled itself as a "people's" committee even though most of its support came from corpo-
rations. Id. at 4.
9. The opposition to an anti-smoking question in California, the Committee Against
Regulatory Excess (CARE), received $1.75 million in contributions from four tobacco compa-
nies during the last month of the campaign. Id. at 46. This information became public only
two weeks before the vote. Id. Note that prior to this, CARE stressed that it spoke for in-state
businesses and emphasized the local nature of its support. In fact, an overwhelming amount of
its financing came from out of state tobacco companies. Id. at 46-47.
10. See, e.g., National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Citizens Against
Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
11. See, e.g., Shockley, Direct Democracy, Campaign Finance, and the Courts: Can Cor-
ruption, Undue Influence, and Declining Voter Confidence be Found? 39 U. MIAMI L. REV.
377 (1985) [hereinafter Shockley, Direct Democracy]; Easley, Direct Democracy Buying Back
the First Amendment: Regulation of Disproportionate Corporate Spending in Ballot Issue Cam-
paigns, 17 GA. L. REV. 675 (1983); Shockley, Money in Politics.- Judicial Roadblocks to Cam-
paign Finance Reform, 10 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 679 (1983) [hereinafter Shockley, Money in
Politics]; Mickenberg, supra note 1. But see Mueller & Partinello, The Constitutionality of
Limits on Ballot Measure Contributions, 57 N.D.L. REV. 391 (1981); Note, Statutory Limita-
tions on Corporate Spending in Ballot Measure Campaigns: The Case for Constitutionality, 36
HASTINGS L.J. 433 (1985); Note, State and Local Limitations on Ballot Measure Contributions,
79 MICH. L. REV. 1421 (1981).
12. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765.
13. Arkansas Gazette, Oct. 1, 1988, at B1, col. 2. The group which filed the court case,
Committee Against Amendment 4, was composed of business and conservative groups.
Among its members were the following groups: Family, Life, America, and God (FLAG); the
Arkansas Association of Realtors; the Arkansas Farm Bureau; the Arkansas Sheriffs Associa-
tion. Anti-tax crusader Tom Ferstl headed the group. Although the Committee Against
Amendment 4 continued to oppose the amendment, it did not figure in the last minute media
blitz which so angered proponents of Amendment 4.
14. Arkansas Gazette, Oct. 13, 1988, at Al, col. 2. The lawsuits challenged the ballot
[Vol. 12:481
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that a poll showed that both amendments enjoyed popular support.' 5
One week before the vote, Governor Clinton, apparently confident of
victory, formed a committee to push for passage of Amendment 4.16
The committee intended to engage in only a modest amount of adver-
tising.' 7 Clinton brushed off a question about the delay in forming the
committee by saying that the opposition had not gone beyond distrib-
uting fliers yet.
18
The situation changed almost immediately. The Arkansas Ga-
zette reported on November 4 that a well-financed opposition group,
the Committee Against Higher Taxes, had recently bought over
$28,000 worth of television advertising from the three major Little
Rock stations. 19 Two of their thirty-second ads were scheduled to run
until election day.20 The ads accused Governor Clinton of favoring
both the Ethics Act and the Fair Tax Amendment as a way to raise
taxes for his 1989 proposed $200 million spending program. They
labeled the program a "tax package monster" and concluded that
there was "nothing fair or ethical about higher taxes."' 2'
Clinton claimed the ads were "absolutely false." He speculated
that powerful lobbyists were financing the opposition because of their
fear of the public disclosure the proposed act would require.22 Craig
Smith, the Governor's aide in charge of the two campaigns, said that
"somebody out there is trying to buy this election and we don't know
who it is."'23 The only information available about the Committee
Against Higher Taxes came from its incorporation papers. A Little
Rock lawyer, C.J. Giroir, was listed as the president and two of his
employees were listed as the other corporate officers.24 The Gazette
speculated that wealthy businessman Jack Stephens might be financ-
titles as misleading. For a discussion of the Arkansas law concerning the qualification of ballot
titles, see Kennedy, supra note 4.
15. Arkansas Gazette, Oct. 25, 1988, at B6, col. 3. The Gazette poll showed that 54% of
the respondents favored the Fair Tax Amendment, 22% opposed it, and 24% were undecided.
16. Arkansas Gazette, Nov. 1, 1988, at B2, col. 4. The committee seemingly attempted to
show the broad range of support the amendment enjoyed. Among its members were Senators
Max Howell and John Miller, Arkansas Education Association President Ed Bullington,












ing the campaign because of Giroir's prior legal and business connec-
tions to Stephens.25
Gazette columnist John Brummett warned that Arkansans were
about to be subjected to a lot of "expensive baloney."' 26 He claimed
that powerful interests were mounting last-minute opposition to the
Fair Tax Amendment and "doing it with a cynical, obscene, and un-
ethical outpouring of mysterious special interest money for television
and radio commercials that are simply dishonest."' 27 Brummett la-
mented that voters would not know who financed the ads because
Arkansas did not have a law requiring the disclosure of a ballot com-
mittee's major financial backers.28
. The money poured in on both sides. Governor Clinton declared
on November 5 that he had raised almost $40,000 for the committee
favoring the amendment. 29 Nevertheless, the Gazette indicated that
the Giroir-headed committee planned to spend $100,000 statewide
before election day.3 0 On November 6, Giroir refused to disclose his
committee's financial contributors saying that he followed the "long-
standing and widely respected tradition of confidentiality afforded
supporters of committees like the one I represent."'"
In spite of the support it enjoyed in the opinion poll conducted
just three weeks earlier, the Fair Tax Amendment was soundly de-
feated at the polls. Next day returns showed the amendment losing
by a sixty-one to thirty-nine percent margin.32 Although it is possible
that the opinion poll failed to discover the true degree of opposition to
the Fair Tax Amendment, the effect of the Committee Against Higher
Taxes' media campaign cannot be ignored.33 The committee's finan-




29. Id., Nov. 5, 1988, at BI, col. 5. At the same time, Clinton angrily rebuffed a ques-
tioner who pressed him for the names of the people behind the opposition. Clinton said that he
had already listed the names of the lobbyists he believed responsible for the "fear and smear"
campaign.
30. Id.
31. Id., Nov. 6, 1988, at NI, col. 4.
32. Id., Nov. 9, 1988, at AI, col. 3; Id., Nov. 9, 1988, at B8, col. 3. Ironically, the Ethics
Act passed by an almost identical margin and is now codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 21-8-401
to 803 (Supp. 1989), as amended by Act of March 21, 1989, No. 719.
33. Professor Shockley argues that money has been more successful when used to defeat a
ballot proposal. Shockley, Direct Democracy, supra note 11, at 393. Moreover, Magleby has
pointed out that large shifts in voter sentiment were several times more likely to occur in ballot
elections than in candidate elections. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 2, at 298. Finally, one compre-
hensive study has shown that corporate contributions opposing ballot measures were success-
ful 25 out of 32 times, and that the side spending the most money was successful 29 out of 39
484 [Vol. 12:481
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cial supporters were never revealed.
Against this background, in March 1989 the Arkansas General
Assembly passed the "Disclosure Act for Public Initiatives, Referen-
dums, and Measures Referred to the Voters by the General Assem-
bly."'34 This Article will assess the constitutionality of this Act.
II. THE DISCLOSURE ACT
The Act imposes disclosure requirements similar to those im-
posed on candidates by state and federal law in partisan elections.35
Ballot or legislative question committees are required to file a state-
ment of organization with the Secretary of State within ten days after
the committee is formed.36 The statement of organization must in-
clude the following:
1. The name, address, and telephone number of the
committee;
37
2. the name, address, and telephone number of the treas-
urer and other principal officers;
38
3. the name and address of the financial institutions where
times. S. LYDENBURG, supra note 6. This describes the situation in Arkansas in 1988. In
addition to the $100,000 spent by the Committee Against Higher Taxes, the independent Com-
mittee Against Amendment 4 spent at least $24,000. Arkansas Gazette, Nov. 4, 1988, at A4,
col. 2.
34. Act of March 1, 1989, No. 261; Act of March 17, 1989, No. 634 (both acts codified at
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 7-9-401 to 410 (Supp. 1989). Arkansas was one of the last states to enact
ballot committee disclosure requirements. As of 1985, only Arkansas, Nevada, North Dakota,
and Utah did not have disclosure statutes. Shockley, Direct Democracy, supra note 11, at 392
n.55.
35. Compare 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 to 456 (1982) and ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6-201 to 214
(1987 & Supp. 1989).
36. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-404(a)(1) (Supp. 1989). A "ballot question" is defined as "a
question in the form of a statewide initiative or referendum which is submitted or intended to
be submitted to a popular vote at an election whether or not it qualifies for the ballot." Id. § 7-
9-402(1). A "legislative question" is defined as "a question in the form of a measure referred
by the Arkansas General Assembly to a popular vote at an election." Id. § 7-9-402(6). A
"ballot question committee" is "any person, other than an individual, who receives contribu-
tions or makes expenditures for the purpose of attempting to influence the qualification, pas-
sage, or defeat of any ballot question." Id. § 7-9-402(2). A "legislative question committee" is
identical to a ballot question committee except that it is concerned with the passage or defeat
of a legislative question. Id. § 7-9-402(7). The term "person" has a technical meaning in the
Act: "any individual, business, proprietorship, firm, partnership, joint venture, syndicate,
business trust, labor organization, company, corporation, association, committee, or any other
organization or group of persons acting in concert." Id. § 7-9-402(8).
Throughout this article I will use the term "ballot committee" to refer to both types of
committees. In addition, I will use the term "referenda or referendum" to refer to both types
of committees.
37. Id. § 7-9-404(2)(b)(1).
38. Id. § 7-9-404(2)(b)(2).
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the committee "deposits money or anything else of mone-
tary value;" 39
4. the names of the committee's members;4°
5. a statement identifying the ballot or legislative ques-
tion(s) in which the committee is interested.4'
The Act also limits cash contributions.42 Groups subject to the
Act may not accept any cash contribution in excess of one hundred
dollars.43 Moreover, committees may not spend more than fifty dol-
lars in cash to influence the vote on a ballot question.44 Finally, any
anonymous contribution in excess of fifty dollars must be paid to the
Secretary of State.45
Once a committee either receives contributions or makes expend-
itures totaling more than $250, it must file financial reports with the
Secretary of State." This filing requirement also applies to an individ-
ual who, on his own, spends more than $250 to influence the vote on
one of these measures.47
The filing requirements resemble those imposed on election com-
39. Id. § 7-9-404(2)(b)(3).
40. Id. § 7-9-404(2)(b)(4).
41. Id. § 7-9-404(2)(b)(5). The exact words of the statute require "[a] brief statement
identifying the substance of each ballot question whose qualification, passage, or defeat the
committee seeks to influence or of each legislative question whose passage or defeat the com-
mittee seeks to influence." Id This section makes clear that the requirements of the act ex-
tend even to those groups who attempt to influence the qualification process. "Qualification of
a ballot question" is defined as "any action or process, legal or otherwise, through which a
ballot question obtains certification to be on the ballot at an election." Id. § 7-9-402(9).
42. "Contributions" are defined broadly:
(A) "Contribution" means, whether direct or indirect, advances, deposits, transfers
of funds, contracts, or obligations, whether or not legally enforceable, payments,
gifts, subscriptions, assessments, payment for services, dues, advancements, forbear-
ance, loans, pledge or promise of money or anything of value, whether or not legally
enforceable, to a person for the purpose of influencing the qualification, passage, or
defeat of a ballot question or the passage or defeat of a legislative question;
(B) "Contribution" includes the purchase of tickets for events, such as dinners,
luncheons, rallies and similar fund-raising events, and the granting of discounts or
rebates by television and radio stations and newspapers, not extended on an equal
basis to all persons seeking to influence the qualification, passage, or defeat of a ballot
question or the passage or defeat of a legislative question;
(C) "Contribution" shall not include noncompensated, nonreimbursed volunteer
personal services or travel.
Id. § 7-9-402(3).
43. Id. § 7-9-405(a).
44. Id. § 7-9-405(b).
45. Id. § 7-9-405(d). By the same token, contributions must be made in the legal name of
the contributor. Id. § 7-9-405(c).
46. Id. § 7-9-406(a).
47. Id. § 7-9-406(b). Contributions to a committee would not count as an expenditure for
purposes of this section.
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mittees. The exact requirements are different for an individual than
for a committee. Pursuant to section 7-9-407(2)(A) of the Arkansas
Code, a committee must report the following:
(i) The total amount of contributions received during the
period covered by the financial report;
(ii) The total amount of expenditures made during the pe-
riod covered by the financial report;
(iii) The cumulative amount of those totals for each ballot
question or legislative question;
(iv) The balance of cash and cash equivalents on hand at
the beginning and the end of the period covered by the financial
report;
(v) The total amount of contributions received during the
period covered by the financial statement from persons who con-
tributed two hundred fifty dollars ($250) or less, and the cumula-
tive amount of that total for each ballot question or legislative
question;
(vi) The total amount of contributions received during the
period covered by the financial statement from persons who con-
tributed two hundred fifty dollars ($250) or more and the cumula-
tive amount of that total for each ballot question or legislative
question;
(vii) The name and street address of each person from whom
a contribution(s) exceeding two hundred fifty dollars ($250) was
received during the period covered by the financial report, together
with the amount contributed, the date of receipt, and the cumula-
tive amount contributed by that person for each ballot question or
legislative question.
Subsection B of this statute specifies what an individual must report:
(i) The total amount of expenditures made during the pe-
riod covered by the financial report;
(ii) The cumulative amount of that total for each ballot
question or legislative question.48
Both committees and individuals must report the name and ad-
dress "of each person to whom expenditures totaling two hundred
fifty dollars ($250) or more were made," and the "amount of each
separate expenditure to each person" during the covered period.49
These reports must be filed every thirty days following the first contri-
bution or the first expenditure.5° Knowing noncompliance with any
48. Id. § 7-9-407(2)(A).
49. Id. § 7-9-407(3).
50. Id. § 7-9-409(a)(1). A financial report must be filed no later than four days before an
1989-901
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of the provisions of the Act carries a possible sentence of one year in
prison or a one thousand dollar fine, or both.5 The statement of or-
ganization and the financial reports are open to public inspection in
the Secretary of State's office.5 2
The compelled disclosure of contributors' names raises the most
serious constitutional questions. It can be argued that such disclo-
sures violate the first amendment guarantee of free speech by chilling
both the exercise of speech itself and the right to associate with others
to advance one's cause. Even if the Act is constitutional on its face,
its application to controversial groups may violate the first amend-
ment. In addition, the scope of the Act may be either vague or over-
broad. It may not sufficiently identify those groups subject to the Act;
on the other hand, it may include so many groups that it impermissi-
bly intrudes upon the rights of speech and association. In particular,
the Act may impermissibly infringe the rights of churches and news-
papers to take positions on matters relating to ballot questions.
This Article analyzes these various claims and, with one excep-
tion, finds them lacking. Although the Act infringes upon speech,
any harm is outweighed by the public benefit of disclosure. Moreover,
the Act, on its face, does not burden the right of association. Any
group which makes such a claim must be able to show that the re-
quired disclosures will subject the group to public or private harass-
ment. Nevertheless, the definition of ballot question and legislative
question committees must be narrowed to avoid vagueness and over-
breadth problems. Finally, although not required by the Constitu-
tion, the Act should be amended to provide an in camera
administrative or judicial proceeding for groups claiming constitu-
tional exemptions from the Act's requirements.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND ELECTIONS
The seminal case in this area of law is Buckley v. Valeo 53 where
the United States Supreme Court considered numerous constitutional
challenges to the Federal Campaign Practices Act of 1971 (as
amended in 1974).14 The Court held that limitations on contributions
were constitutional because they did not infringe on the quantity of
election with a closing date no later than seven days before the election. Id. § 7-9-409(a)(2). A
final report must be filed within thirty days after the election. Id. § 7-9-409(a)(3).
51. Id. § 7-9-403. The act also assesses a penalty for the late filing of the required reports
or documents. See Id. §§ 7-9-404(a)(2), 404(c) and 409(b).
52. Id. § 7-9-410.
53. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
54. Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 to 456 (1982).
[Vol. 12:481
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political speech, but that limitations on expenditures were unconstitu-
tional because they directly limited the quantity of political speech.
55
In addition, the Court upheld the reporting and disclosure require-
ments of the Act, finding that the requirements were supported by
sufficiently important governmental interests to outweigh any in-
fringement on privacy. 6 Moreover, any minor parties which claimed
that disclosure would cause harm must show a reasonable probability
that compelled disclosure would lead to harassment."
The- Court has considered other challenges to the federal statute
in the years since Buckley. In California Medical Association v. Fed-
eral Election Commission " a fragmented Court upheld the Act's limi-
tations on contributions by individuals and by unincorporated
associations to multi-party political committees. A plurality of the
Court held that the law did not violate the first amendment because
the restrictions did not prevent the group's members from spending
their own money apart from the group to advocate their point of
view.5 9 If limitations on campaign contributions are constitutional,
then similar limitations on amounts given to political committees are
also constitutional.' Justice Blackmun provided the fifth vote by
concurring in part and in the judgment. Although he rejected Buck-
ley's contribution/expenditure distinction, he upheld the limitations
because they were necessary to preserve the Act's overall contribution
limitations.61 Similarly, in Federal Election Commission v. National
Right to Work Committee62 the Court upheld the Act's requirement
that a nonstock corporation can only solicit money from its members
when it uses this money in specified ways in federal elections.
Most states regulate elections in a manner similar to the federal
model.63 Arkansas has long had candidate disclosure laws.'
55. 424 U.S. at 143.
56. Id. at 84.
57. Id. at 69.
58. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
59. A majority of the Court held that the limitation did not violate the equal protection
clause even though the Act permitted unlimited corporate and union contributions to a segre-
gated fund. Id. at 200. The Court found that the Act imposed fewer restrictions on individu-
als and unincorporated associations than it did on corporations and labor unions. Id. These
different restrictions reflected Congressional judgment that the differences in structure re-
quired different rules to effectuate the purpose of the Act. Id. at 201.
60. Id. at 197.
61. Id. at 293. Chief Justice Burger, Justices Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist dissenting
on jurisdictional grounds.
62. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
63. For a summary of state laws relating to candidate elections, see PALMER &
1989-90]
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IV. LIMITATIONS ON CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES
As previously stated, Buckley v. Valeo65 is the seminal case in
this area of law. In Buckley the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered numerous constitutional challenges to the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act66 raised by a mixture of conservative, liberal, political, and
civil rights groups.67 The Court held that the contribution limitations
were constitutional but the expenditure limitations were not.
The Court clearly established that giving and spending money in
political campaigns is protected speech. Discussions of public issues
and a candidate's qualifications "are integral to the operation of the
system of government established by our Constitution."6 The Court
noted that "there is practically universal agreement that a major pur-
pose of [the first amendment] was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs . . . of course includ[ing] discussions of candi-
dates .... ,,69 The speech's dependence on the expenditure of money
does not change its character.7 °
The Court saw a difference between expenditure limitations and
contribution limitations. Whereas expenditure limitations reduce
"the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues dis-
cussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached,"' contribution limitations "entailfl only a marginal restric-
tion upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communica-
tion. 17 2 Every form of modern communication needs money and the
FEIGENBAUM, CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 88: A SUMMARY OF STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE
LAWS (National Clearinghouse on Election Administration, Federal Election Commission).
64. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-6-201 to 214 (1987 & Supp. 1989).
65. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
66. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(1974), amending Federal Election Campaign Act, Pub. L. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971) (codified
as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 to 456 (1982) and in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
67. The original plaintiffs included: a presidential candidate, a senatorial candidate and
his potential contributor, the Committee for a Constitutional Presidency-McCarthy '76, the
New York State Conservative Party, the Mississippi Republican Party, the Libertarian Party,
the New York Civil Liberties Union, the American Conservative Union, the Conservative Vic-
tory Fund, and Human Events, Inc., 424 U.S. at 8. Various other groups and individuals
intervened in the lawsuit including Common Cause and the League of Women Voters. Id. at 9
n.5.
68. Id. at 14.
69. Id. (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
70. Id. at 16. The Buckley case has been extensively analyzed. Among the most critical
commentaries have been Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics.- Is the First Amendment
an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1982); Shockley, Money In Politics,
supra note 11.
71. 424 U.S. at 19.
72. Id. at 20-21.
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increasing dependence on the modem media increases the cost of
communicating one's message.73 On the other hand, a contribution is
only a "general expression of support" for a candidate without the
rationale for the support. 74 The amount of the communication does
not increase with the size of the contribution. Instead, "the expres-
sion rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contribut-
ing."7" If contribution limitations prevented a candidate from getting
the money necessary to communicate her message, then serious first
amendment problems would arise. The limitations imposed by the
federal act did not have this effect. Thus, the limitations on expendi-
tures more significantly infringed on protected speech than the limita-
tions on contributions.
The Court concluded that the expenditure limitations violated
the Constitution but the contribution limitations did not. The limita-
tion on contributions is justified by the important governmental inter-
est in deterring corruption. The Court said that "[t]o the extent that
large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from
current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of rep-
resentative democracy is undermined. ' 76 Moreover, even the appear-
ance of corruption erodes public confidence in government.77
Balanced against this important interest were limitations on contribu-
tions that did not materially affect "the potential for robust and effec-
tive discussion of candidates and campaign issues by individual
citizens, associations, the institutional press, candidates, and political
parties."'78 Thus, the Court found no constitutional infirmity in the
Act's limitations on contributions.
On the other hand, the Court discerned that the expenditure lim-
itations resulted in a much greater infringement on protected speech
and that the connection to any important governmental interest was
much more tenuous. The Court rejected the argument that the pre-
vention of corruption justified the limitations. Limiting expenditures
did not sufficiently relate to the core problem: the elimination of quid
pro quo arrangements between the candidate and the contributor.7 9
Moreover, the limitations "heavily burden[ed] core First Amendment
73. Id. at 19.
74. Id. at 21.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 26-27.
77. Id. at 27.
78. Id. at 29.
79. Id. at 45.
1989-90]
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expression. The first amendment interests clearly outweighed the
governmental interests.
The Arkansas Act contains some regulations of cash contribu-
tions and expenditures. 81 No committee may accept any cash contri-
butions over $100. Although the Buckley Court upheld the
contribution limitations in the federal act, it still found contributions
to be protected expression. Any limitations must be justified by im-
portant governmental interests. While the deterrence of corruption
justifies limiting contributions in an election campaign, that interest
simply does not exist in a ballot question campaign. Beyond deter-
rence of corruption, it is not immediately apparent what governmen-
tal interest justifies this limitation. It is possible that the record-
keeping necessary to prepare for the eventual necessity of reporting
contributions could serve as the justification. The difficulty with this
contention is that one would assume that large contributions, in cash
or by check, would be easier to account for than numerous small cash
contributions, yet the Act allows the receipt of cash contributions of
less than $100. It could also be argued that the receipt of large cash
contributions would deter state enforcement of the law by making it
difficult to trace the finances of an offending committee. There would
be some increase in the effectiveness of any investigation because of
the ease with which financial records may be obtained from banks.
8 2
The question is whether these interests outweigh the infringe-
ment on speech brought about by the limitation on cash contribu-
tions. Limiting the size of cash contributions is not a significant
infringement on protected speech. As in Buckley the limitation does
not deter the core expression and symbolic act of contributing to a
cause. The infringement is even slighter than in Buckley because the
absolute size of contributions is not limited at all. Individuals or
groups may contribute as much as they like as long as they do so by
check. In the modern world, this surely would not amount to a sub-
stantial limitation on the freedom of speech. Therefore, the govern-
mental interests would outweigh this rather slight infringement on
speech.
Committees may not spend more than fifty dollars in cash. This,
too, passes constitutional muster. Any absolute limitation on expend-
80. Id. at 48.
81. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-405 (Supp. 1989).
82. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401 to 3422 (1982) (outlining procedures to follow in govern-
ment investigations of bank records). Congress passed this law, the Bank Secrecy Act, in
response to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976),
which held that a depositor had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his bank records.
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itures would present serious constitutional problems. As with cash
contributions, however, there is no absolute limit on the amount a
committee may spend as long as it uses a check. Whatever small in-
fringement on speech this creates is outweighed by the governmental
interest in enforcement of the law. Once again, investigations of re-
porting violations would necessarily involve an examination of the
committee's financial records. Access to the paper trail left by checks
would greatly facilitate both compliance with and enforcement of the
law.
Buckley also rejected a challenge to the federal act's monetary
thresholds. The law required political committees to keep records of
the names and addresses of anyone who made contributions over ten
dollars. Once a person's aggregate contributions exceeded $100, the
Act required the committee to record her name, address, occupation,
and principal place of business.8 3 The plaintiffs claimed these limits
were overbroad because they lacked a substantial nexus to the govern-
mental interests. In other words, they were so low that contributions
in those amounts were unlikely to have a corrupting influence on the
candidate.8 4
Although Congress apparently adopted the limits from the 1910
Act, the Court refused to second-guess that decision. 5 Moreover, the
Court underscored the importance of the information and enforce-
ment functions of the Act when it said:
We are mindful that disclosure serves informational functions, as
well as the prevention of corruption and the enforcement of the
contribution limitations. Congress is not required to set a thresh-
old that is tailored only to the latter goals. In addition, the en-
forcement goal can never be well served if the threshold is so high
that disclosure becomes equivalent to admitting violation of the
contribution limitations.8 6
The Court left open the question of whether or not public disclo-
sure of contributions between ten dollars and one hundred dollars was
unconstitutional. The Act did not authorize the Federal Election
Commission to disclose such amounts and thus there was no basis to
decide the issue in the case.
The Arkansas Act uses $250 as the threshold. Any committee
which either receives contributions or makes expenditures over $250
83. 2 U.S.C. §§ 432(c)(2), 438(a)(8) (1982).
84. 424 U.S. at 82.
85. Id. at 83.
86. Id. at 83-84.
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must file a financial report with the Secretary of State.87 Individuals
who spend more than $250 must also file a report.8 8 The committee's
report must disclose, among other things, the total amount it received
from individuals who contributed $250 or more, and the name, ad-
dress, amount contributed, the date of receipt, and the cumulative
amount received from each individual who contributed more than
$250.89 Both an individual and a committee must disclose the name
and address of every person to whom expenditures of more than $250
were made during the reporting period.9°
These limits present no constitutional problems. As in Buckley,
the legislature must be given the latitude to set the amount so that the
law's goals may be achieved. Here the goal of the Act is to provide
the voters information on the finances of the proponents and oppo-
nents of ballot questions. The threshold is located where both the
informational purpose may be served and the associational rights of
the contributors are' respected. Thus, the small, grass-roots contribu-
tor need not fear that her ten dollar donation to a cause will become
public information.
The Act does not provide any threshold for record-keeping, how-
ever. Presumably, ballot committees should keep records of all con-
tributions in case one of the contributors eventually exceeds the $250
threshold for disclosure. The sheer volume of records for some grass-
roots groups may unduly burden the group's speech rights.9'
V. COMPELLED DISCLOSURE: FREE SPEECH
The Arkansas Act also requires ballot committees to disclose the
names of their members as well as the names of some contributors
and the amounts of their contributions.92 This kind of compelled dis-
closure raises both free speech and free association issues. In this sec-
tion, I will consider the free speech issues. I will consider the free
association issues in the next section.
There are two separate free speech issues: (1) whether or not the
required disclosures unnecessarily infringe on the protected speech;
and (2) whether or not the required disclosures chill the right of asso-
87. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-406(a) (Supp. 1989).
88. Id. § 7-9-406(b).
89. Id. § 7-9-407(2)(A).
90. Id. § 7-9-407(3).
91. See infra notes 217-23 and accompanying text.
92. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-407(2)(A)(vii) (Supp. 1989).
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ciation. The law must first be analyzed on its face and then as
applied.
In Burroughs and Cannon v. United States,93 the Supreme Court
upheld an early federal act's disclosure requirements. The plaintiffs
did not raise a first amendment challenge; instead they challenged
Congress' authority to interfere with state appointment of electors.
94
Nevertheless, the Court presaged the modem first amendment analy-
sis when it said that "Congress reached the conclusion that public
disclosure of political contributions, together with the names of con-
tributors and other details, would tend to prevent the corrupt use of
money to affect elections. The verity of this conclusion reasonably
cannot be denied." 95 Later the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act's ban on corporate or union contri-
butions to a federal election campaign in United States v. Interna-
tional Union United Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America.96
In Buckley the Supreme Court upheld the federal act's reporting
and disclosure requirements. 97 The plaintiffs did not attack the dis-
closure requirements as per se violations of the first amendment. In-
deed, they asserted that "narrowly drawn disclosure requirements are
the proper solution to virtually all of the evils Congress sought to
remedy." 98 Instead, plaintiffs attacked the application of the require-
ments to minor-party and independent candidates and to small
contributions.
The Court noted that compelled disclosure can seriously intrude
upon first amendment rights.99 These rights are not absolute, but any
infringement on them must survive exacting. scrutiny."°° This is so
93. 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
94. Id. at 536 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1).
95. Id. at 548.
96. 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
97. At the time of this decision the Act required disclosures very similar to those imposed
on ballot and legislative question committees. "Political committees" had to maintain detailed
records of their contributions and expenditures. These included the names and addresses of
everyone making a contribution over ten dollars. 2 U.S.C. § 432(c) (amended 1980). These
committees had to file quarterly reports with the commission detailing the names, mailing
addresses, occupations, and principal places of business of everyone who contributed more
than $100 in a calendar year and the date of the contributions. Id. § 434(b) (amended 1980).
Any individual or group who was not a political committee and made contributions or expend-
itures in excess of $100 in a calendar year was required to file an abbreviated statement with
the commission. Id. § 434(e) (amended 1980). [Since Buckley was decided, Congress has
amended the cited requirement. Ed. note.]
98. 424 U.S. 1, 60 (1976) (quoting Brief for Appellants at 171).
99. Id. at 64.
100. Id. at 64-65.
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because group association enhances effective first amendment advo-
cacy by allowing individuals to pool their money and resources.' 0 '
Only important government interests can justify any limitations on
this right.
The Court found three interests which supported the reporting
and disclosure requirements. They were (1) to aid the voter to evalu-
ate candidates, (2) to deter corruption, and (3) to aid in detecting vio-
lations of the Act's contribution limitations.0 2 The Court held that
these interests outweighed the burden compelled disclosure placed on
first amendment rights. In this regard, the Court agreed with the idea
that "disclosure requirements--certainly in most applications-ap-
pear to be the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign
ignorance and corruption that Congress found to exist."'' 3
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the precise is-
sue of the constitutionality of reporting requirements for ballot com-
mittees, it has addressed other limitations on the referendum process.
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti "o the Court struck down
a Massachusetts law which prohibited corporate contributions and
expenditures on ballot questions. Although Congress could prevent
corporate spending in partisan elections, ballot questions presented a
different situation: "The risk of corruption perceived in cases involv-
ing candidate election.., simply is not present in a popular vote on a
public issue."' 0 5 The danger of corporate dominance was alleviated
by the opportunity of the people to evaluate the source of the speech.
The Court commented: "[T]he people in our democracy are en-
trusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative
merits of conflicting arguments. They may consider, in making their
judgment, the source and credibility of the advocate."' 0 6
In Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v.
City of Berkeley 07 the Court held that a $250 limit on contributions
to ballot committees violated the first amendment. The Berkeley case
did not implicate the corruption rationale which supported Buckley's
101. Id. at 65.
102. Id. at 67-68.
103. Id. at 68.
104. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
105. Id. at 790.
106. Id. at 791-92. The footnote to this passage reads: "Identification of the source of
advertising may be required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to evaluate
the arguments to which they are being subjected. In addition, we emphasized in Buckley the
prophylactic effect of requiring the source of the communication be disclosed." Id. at 792 n.32
(citations omitted).
107. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
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"single narrow exception to the rule that limits on political contribu-
tions" violate the first amendment. The Court rejected the argument
that the contribution limit was necessary to help identify the support-
ers of a particular ballot question.
It is true that when individuals or corporations speak through
committees they often adopt seductive names that may tend to
conceal the true identity of the source. Here, there is no risk that
the Berkeley voters will be in doubt as to the identity of those
whose money supports or opposes a given ballot measure since
contributors must make their identities known under § 112 of the
ordinance, which requires publication of lists of contributors in ad-
vance of the voting.108
The Court also found that the contribution limitation necessarily
infringed on the ability of committees to make expenditures. Again
the Court spoke approvingly of the disclosure provisions saying that
"[t]he integrity of the political system will be adequately protected if
contributors are identified in a public filing, revealing the amounts
contributed; if it is thought wise, legislation can outlaw anonymous
contributions. " 19
Several federal courts have also addressed state regulation of the
ballot process. In Let's Help Florida v. McCrary110 the Fifth Circuit
struck down a provision limiting the amount of individual contribu-
tions to $3000. Presaging Berkeley the court rejected the argument
that the limitation was needed to deter corruption. The court noted
that in a candidate election the people elect their delegate. In that
case, contribution limitations are necessary to forestall the possibility
of improper influence.11" ' When people vote on a ballot question,
however, "they directly decide the pertinent political issue for them-
selves. Large contributions for publicity by one group or another do
not influence the political decisionmakers-in this case, the voters
themselves-except in a manner protected by the First Amend-
ment." '112 Thus, the limitation violated the first amendment.
The court also rejected the argument that the contribution limi-
tation promoted adequate disclosure. While disclosure is an impor-
tant state interest, contribution limitations are not sufficiently related
to that interest." 3 In dicta, the court seemed to approve of disclosure
108. Id. at 298.
109. Id. at 299-300.
110. 621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980).
111. Id. at 199-200.





Florida can and does effectively promote the disclosure of large
contributors through measures that are less harmful to first amend-
ment rights. For example, [other sections of the law] require polit-
ical committees to register with the state and to file information
about each contribution and contributor throughout the campaign.
This information is available to the public and may be published
through newspapers and other media. [Another section of the law]
requires the disclosure of the source of payment for all political
advertisements and campaign literature. Measures such as these
provide adequate disclosure without directly restricting contribu-
tions or other important first amendment rights." 4
Other circuit courts have struck down laws which prohibited
corporate participation in the referendum process. Courts in two
cases rejected the corruption rationale and referred to the less restric-
tive alternative of public disclosure.I" In Schwartz v. Romnes "6 the
Second Circuit noted that public disclosures minimized the risk that
the public would be misled on the corporate financed views.I 7 Simi-
larly, in Michigan State Chamber of Commerce v. Austin ",8 the Sixth
Circuit held that a state law limiting the amount corporations could
contribute to ballot questions committees infringed the first amend-
ment rights of speech and association. The court pointed out that
the limitation was not necessary in view of the law's disclosure
requirements. '19
State courts addressing the issue have unanimously upheld ballot
114. Id. at 200-01. See also Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. State, 408 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1982)
where the Florida Supreme Court approvingly cited this quotation in a case involving the same
issue.
115. C & C Plywood Corp. v. Hanson, 583 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1978); Schwartz v. Romnes,
495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974).
116. 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974).
117. Id. at 851.
118. 856 F.2d 783 (6th Cir.) reh. den., 865 F.2d 716 (1988).
As this article was going to press, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion
reversing the Sixth Circuit's ruling. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 58 U.S.L.W.
4371 (Mar. 27, 1990). The majority held that the state had a compelling interest in regulating
the distorting effect corporate wealth might have on the ballot process. The ban on the use of
general corporate funds is narrowly tailored to achieve that end in light of the availability of a
separate corporate political fund which can be used to advance the corporation's position. The
Court distinguished Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S.
238 (1986), on the grounds that the Chamber of Commerce exists for purposes in addition to
political expression, its members were more like shareholders, and it is not free from corporate
influence. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and O'Connor dissented.
119. Id. at 789.
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committee reporting and disclosure laws.' 20 In Messerli v. State '21 a
person refused to file the required report after running two newspaper
advertisements relating to a municipal bond election. On appeal, the
Alaska Supreme Court upheld the reporting requirement against a
first amendment challenge. The court noted that an expenditure to
influence a ballot question is closer to pure political speech than an
expenditure in a candidate election because the former is often an ex-
pression of the contributor's own personal beliefs. 22 The individual
"exercises the right of free speech directly on his own behalf, ad-
dresses whatever he sees as the merits of an issue, expresses his own
opinions, and makes his own recommendations to the public.' 23 Be-
cause ballot propositions frequently involve controversial topics, a
person advocating an unpopular position could be reluctant to take
such a position if his name must be publicly disclosed.1 2' Thus, any
disclosure requirements burden important first amendment rights.
Nevertheless, the court found that the need for an informed electorate
outweighed the burden on first amendment rights.
Proper evaluation of the arguments made on either side [of a ballot
issue] can often be assisted by knowing who is backing each propo-
sition .... [Like the bias of a witness], [s]uch information is no
less important to an intelligent evaluation of what is being said
during an election campaign. Similarly, a ballot issue is often of
great importance financially to its proponents or opponents, or
both, and multi-million dollar advertising campaigns have been
waged. In such circumstances, the voter may wish to cast his bal-
lot in accordance with his approval, or disapproval, of the sources
120. See, e.g., Bemis Pentecostal Church v. State, 731 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. 1987); Iowans for
Tax Relief v. Campaign Finance Disclosure Comm'n, 331 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1983); Messerli
v. State, 626 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1981); Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1975 PA 227,
396 Mich. 465, 242 N.W.2d 3 (1976); Brown v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 5 Cal.
3d 509, 487 P.2d 1224, 96 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1971) (Disclosure law does not violate equal protec-
tion clause).
Cf New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Comm'n v. Citizens to Make Mayor-Council
Gov't Work, 208 N.J. Super. 583, 506 A.2d 773, certification granted, 104 N.J. 442, 517 A.2d
432 (1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 107 N.J. 380, 526 A.2d 1069 (1987).
But see Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. State, 408 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1982) (striking down an
expenditure limitation in referenda elections); Anderson's Paving, Inc. v. Hayes, 295 S.E.2d
805 (W. Va. 1982) (prohibition of corporate contribution to ballot campaigns unconstitu-
tional); Opinion of the Justices, 461 A.2d 701 (Me. 1983) (statute limiting contributions to
ballot campaigns would be unconstitutional).
121. 626 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1981).
122. Id. at 85.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 86.
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of financial support. 125
Finally, in Bemis Pentecostal Church v. State,126 the Tennessee
Supreme Court upheld the facial validity of a ballot disclosure act but
interpreted the act so as not to apply to regular church activities. In
this case, the plaintiff churches actively opposed a local option liquor-
by-the-drink referendum in a variety of ways. 127 They refused to file a
disclosure statement as required by state law, and they filed suit after
the state Attorney General notified them that they must comply with
the act.
The court upheld the act. Noting the importance of referenda on
community life, the court concluded that
the public has the right to know at a minimum how campaigns on
public issues are financed and by whom. Large undisclosed contri-
butions can distort public sensibilities and allow confidence in the
electoral system to wane as the perception waxes that elections can
be unduly influenced by wealthy special interests and well-financed
factions. 1
28
Moreover, the state's compelling interest in open government
also supported the disclosure requirements. By requiring these re-
ports, the state may deter corruption of the process by assuring con-
tributors that their money is being spent in the intended manner. The
paper trail left by the reports makes after-the-fact tracing for enforce-
ment purposes easier.'29 The disclosure requirements give the public
a "gauge" by which to evaluate campaign publicity. Groups wishing
to influence the outcome of a ballot election should not be allowed to
"distort the process by flooding the forum with media campaigns
without at least disclosing this fact to the voters."'
' 30
The Tennessee act only applied to express advocacy in a particu-
lar campaign and not to a generalized discussion of issues that may be
related to a campaign. The Buckley Court limited the federal act to
groups that "expressly advocated" the election of a particular candi-
date in order to avoid potential overbreadth problems. In similar
125. Id. at 87.
126. 731 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. 1987).
127. The churches purchased radio, television, and newspaper advertisements. One of the
plaintiff churches contributed money to a political committee which opposed the referendum.
In addition, the churches broadcast anti-referendum messages during their regularly broadcast
services and published newsletters and church bulletins with messages against the referendum.
Together the thirteen plaintiff churches spent $5150 on the campaign. Id. at 899.
128. Id. at 903.




fashion, the Tennessee court construed the language of their statute to
exempt the regular church activities from the act's disclosure require-
ments. On the other hand, when the churches went beyond their nor-
mal activities and began to urge the defeat of the referendum in
question, they were required to report as any other ballot
committee. '
3I
It appears that the Arkansas law is also constitutional. Never-
theless, several aspects of the analysis need to be developed. First, the
Bemis case seems to adopt a discredited rationale. It indicated that
the disclosure requirements deter corruption, yet the unanimous con-
sensus of the courts, including the United States Supreme Court, is
that corruption is not a problem in referenda because there is no op-
portunity for a quid pro quo. In addition, the court noted that a well-
financed campaign distorts the electoral process by flooding the mar-
ket with messages. Flooding or not, the messages are protected
speech. It is hard to see how an abundance of protected speech "dis-
torts" anything. The Buckley Court adamantly rejected such a ra-
tionale in connection with expenditure limitations. In response to the
argument that such limitations were necessary to equalize electoral
speech, the Court said "the concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the rela-
tive voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment ....
Second, although the Supreme Court's dicta seems to favor dis-
closure, no case has ever explored whether or not the difference in
candidate and ballot elections is sufficient to require a different first
amendment outcome. Buckley advanced three compelling reasons for
disclosure in candidate elections. The deterrence of corruption can-
not apply in ballot elections. Enhancing enforcement of the statutory
scheme arguably applies to ballot elections, but perhaps not so
strongly as candidate elections. In a candidate election, enforcement
is driven by the necessity to deter corruption. Obviously, there is no
such need in ballot elections. The only thing that would need to be
enforced would be the disclosures themselves. Infringement on first
amendment rights surely requires more than the circular need to en-
force the very statute that restricts first amendment rights. Thus,
evaluation of the speaker's position is the only rationale that could
support ballot question disclosure laws. While it may be necessary for
the public to know who "owns" their representatives, the direct de-
mocracy of the ballot process obviates that need. Moreover, the posi-
131. Id. at 906.
132. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
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tion patronizes the voters because it assumes either that they will not
be able to perceive a media blitz for what it is or that they are so
parochial that they will ignore the merits of any argument and vote
on the basis of whether they like or dislike the speaker.
Undoubtedly, knowing the identity of the speaker and his sup-
porters is helpful, but the absence of compelled disclosure does not
prevent the press or private citizens from discovering it. Instead, the
argument goes, compelling disclosure unnecessarily shifts the first
amendment focus from the speaker to the listener. Requiring disclo-
sure puts the power of the government on the listener's side; the ab-
sence of disclosure simply makes the government neutral. The public
is free to make whatever irrational decisions it chooses. The govern-
ment should not force others to provide the information to do so.
Nevertheless, the balance ultimately favors the disclosures.
Bemis is not the only case to consider the issue. The unanimous
weight of authority among courts considering the question supports
limited compelled disclosures in ballot elections. No court has sug-
gested, either directly or in dicta, that compelled disclosure laws are
unconstitutional. Even if the Bemis case is ignored, the overwhelming
weight of authority supports the law. Surely, when courts manifest
this much agreement on an issue, it is difficult to conclude they are all
wrong.
First amendment law has come a long way from the time when
Justice Black argued that the amendment was an absolute prohibition
of any regulations of speech. 33 Modern law assumes that there are
no absolutes. All speech can be regulated in a limited way. The
Supreme Court treats disclosure requirements as the least restrictive
way to achieve the state goal.134 The question is whether or not the
state has good enough reasons for whatever limitations it seeks to im-
pose. Time, place, and manner restrictions and the forum doctrine
are two examples of situations where the Court has developed layered
balancing tests as alternatives to Justice Black's simple absolutism. 
13 5
Although the corruption rationale may not support ballot ques-
133. Justice Black once said that the first amendment means that Congress shall make no
law "without any 'ifs,' 'buts,' or 'whereases.' " Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275
(1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
134. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68: "In this process, we note... that disclosure requirements-
certainly in most applications-appear to be the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of
campaign ignorance and corruption that Congress found to exist."
135. Compare United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) and Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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tion disclosure laws, the evaluation rationale does. As Professor
Shockley points out:
When voting on a ballot proposition, one does not have the ori-
enting devices of party labels or candidate names to serve as
anchors. In addition, because some issues present problems of
great complexity, the electorate sometimes votes against something
for which they actually approve; this possibility of confusion likely
increases the use of deception. 136
Ballot disclosure laws do not patronize voters. In our democracy
we must assume that "information is not in itself harmful, that people
will perceive their own best interests if only they.are well enough in-
formed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of
communication rather than close them." '137 Media campaigns long
ago abandoned the reasoned argument as an issue approach. Modern
campaigns are more style than substance, more flash than fire, rarely
presenting an argument in a sequential manner. Mass media tech-
niques play an even greater role in ballot campaigns than in candidate
elections. 138  Given these pervasive advertising techniques, the source
of the campaign's funds becomes almost the only neutral factor by
which to evaluate a position. Ballot campaign disclosures trust that
voters will use the information about contributions to more critically
examine the various ballot questions.' 39
The first amendment is not exclusively concerned with the
136. Shockley, Money In Politics, supra note 11, at 715-16 (footnotes omitted). But see
Adamany, PACs and the Democratic Financing of Politics, 22 ARIZ. L. REv. 569, 598 (1980):
Disclosure laws generate more information than can be mastered by the media, the
politicians, or the voters-at least in the short-run of a campaign. Media may show
little interest in political financing practices, and their partisan or editorial positions
may color their coverage of such practices by competing candidates. Voters, too, are
likely to evaluate such information through a "perceptual screen" that is colored by
their own partisan allegiances and candidate preferences.
Adamany's article dealt with candidate elections. His observations are impor-
tant for ballot disclosure laws, however. Nevertheless, even if one assumes that vot-
ers and the media are similarly affected by their biases in ballot elections, one can still
make the case for ballot election disclosure laws. Put simply, any disclosure is better
than no disclosure. If the media is slow to respond to the information available, that
hardly justifies not making the information available at all. The governmental inter-
est in disclosure laws is to make information available to the voters and not to skew
the results of any particular vote. If the voters choose to ignore the implications of a
ballot committee's finances, that is their business.
137. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 770
(1976).
138. Mickenberg, supra note 1, at 556.
139. Some scholars argue that after-the-fact disclosures do not provide voters with infor-
mation when they need it. Adamany, supra note 135; Shockley, Direct Democracy, supra note
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speaker side of the equation. The first amendment protects expression
which requires both a speaker and a listener. 14° Some think the first
amendment encompasses a right to know. 14 l I am not suggesting that
the public interest in knowing who finances a ballot campaign is pro-
tected by the first amendment. Rather, I am suggesting that com-
pelled disclosures in this context do not ignore first amendment
values. In many ways they enhance those values by ensuring that, in
direct democratic processes, the people have enough information
available to them to make informed decisions.
More to the point, Buckley stands for the proposition that even
speech relating to the democratic process can be regulated for suffi-
ciently important governmental reasons. The only qualification is
that the limitation cannot directly or indirectly reduce the quantity of
protected speech. This is understandable if one takes either a market-
place 14 2 or a governmental process '43 position on the purpose of the
first amendment. In the marketplace theory, ideas must compete for
11; Note, State and Local Limitations on Ballot Measure Contributions, 79 MICH. L. REV.
1421 (1981).
By the time disclosures are made, the voters may have already been subjected to a barrage
of advertisements using the most sophisticated techniques. Nicholson, The Constitutionality of
Contribution Limitations in Ballot Measure Elections, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 683, 711 (1981). Cf
Shockley, Direct Democracy, supra note 11, at 418 n. 151 (tobacco company used multiple poll-
ing prior to a "No Smoking" initiative to determine how voters might react to tobacco spon-
sored advertisements, finally deciding on an anti-big government name).
See generally Note, supra note 138, at 1443 (supporting more disclosure); Shockley, Direct
Democracy, supra note 11, at 417-18 (supporting disclosure within the advertisement itself by
requiring that the names of a committee's principal donors appear in all committee
advertising).
140. In Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at
756, the Court said that the first amendment "presupposes a willing speaker" but protects the
recipients of information as well.
141. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (public's right to
receive information supports Fairness Doctrine).
142. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market..."); Z. CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY (1956); M. NIMMER, NiMMER ON
FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1984).
143. The governmental process theory posits that the first amendment protects only speech
that is necessary for self-government. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). Meiklejohn defined this category broadly to include literary, sci-
entific, and artistic works. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Cr.
REV. 245, 263. One of its leading contemporary proponents did not similarly expand the
theory. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
Although the Supreme Court has never unambiguously adopted a particular theory for
the first amendment, it has often referred to political speech as "core speech." See, e.g., Mills
v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (universal agreement that the amendment's purpose
"was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs .... "); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (fullest expression given to political expression); Monitor Patriot Co. v.
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favor. Through this competition the best idea presumably emerges.,"
The first amendment insures that debate on public issues is robust,
open, and uninhibited. 145 Any regulation which reduces the number
of "products" in the first amendment marketplace necessarily in-
fringes on the ability of the public to consider all aspects of a question.
In the governmental process theory, the first amendment protects
speech relating to self-government. Ballot questions are examples of
the most direct form of self-government. Thus, the process should
allow the widest dissemination of viewpoints and the widest distribu-
tion of information about those viewpoints. Disclosures allow both
quantity and quality.
It is difficult to see how the compelled disclosures in the Arkan-
sas statute can significantly affect the quantity of protected speech on
ballot questions. First, only the names of contributors over $250 must
be revealed. The small-time, grass roots contributor is assured ano-
nymity. Groups should not have a difficult time raising the money
needed to spread their message. 4 6 Many ballot issues appeal to the
kind of grass roots fundraising which produces numerous small
donations. '4 7
Second, even if some people will not contribute to groups because
of the disclosures, there will not be enough of them to make a signifi-
cant difference in the quantity of political speech. 4 ' Moreover, the
opportunity for controversial groups to challenge the law as applied
to them is the failsafe which ensures that the amount of protected
Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (amendment has its "fullest and most urgent application" to
conduct of political campaigns).
144. Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 390 ("It is the purpose of the First Amend-
ment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail...
.11).
145. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (first amendment
evidence of "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.").
146. I am somewhat uncomfortable with this assertion. The burden of proof should be on
opponents of disclosure, however, I have not found any data to suggest that disclosure limita-
tions have significantly reduced the quantity of speech in either candidate or ballot elections.
If a plaintiff can produce evidence to the contrary, the law would be difficult to justify.
147. Cf. Note, supra note 138 (author points out that most ballot committees focus on one
issue and generally advance their own point of view).
148. Some students in my first amendment seminar believed that a large number of people
will now refrain from contributing to ballot committees because of the disclosure require-
ments. The point awaits empirical validation. It would seem reasonable to place the burden of
proof on the opponents of disclosure. The evidence that disclosures deter significant numbers
of contributors will more likely be available to ballot committees than to the state. To place
the burden on the state to prove that the law does not deter contributors asks the state to prove




speech will not be significantly diminished.149
The cases upholding lobbyists' disclosures are analogous to the
situation of ballot committee disclosures. As one court pointed out,
"[l]obbying is of course a pejorative term, but another name for it is
petitioning for the redress of grievances. It is under the express pro-
tection of the First Amendment."' 50 Nevertheless, some limited regu-
lation of lobbying has always been allowed. In United States v.
Harriss1 "' the Supreme Court upheld federal lobbyist registration and
disclosure provisions which required, among other things, the disclo-
sure of the lobbyist's employer and source of funds. The Court found
a "vital national interest" in the ability of legislators to "properly
evaluate" the "myriad pressures to which they are regularly sub-
jected."' 52 Unless legislators can do this, "the voice of the people may
all too easily be drowned out by the voice of special interest groups
seeking favored treatment while masquerading as proponents of the
public weal."' 53 The Court noted that some people may be dissuaded
from approaching their legislators by the requirements but "the re-
straint is at most an indirect one resulting from self-censorship, com-
parable in many ways to criminal libel laws. The hazard of such
restraint is too remote to require striking down a statute which on its
face is ... designed to safeguard a vital national interest."' 54
Other courts have upheld similar state laws. 55 In Minnesota
State Ethical Practices Board v. National Rifle Association 56 the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to strike down a state law
that required groups to disclose their lobbying and political activities
and to file periodic reports disclosing the names of certain contribu-
tors. Citing Harriss, the court noted the importance of allowing legis-
lators to evaluate the information presented to them. The court
pointed out that Buckley v. Valeo upheld disclosure requirements in
candidate elections partially for the same reason.157
149. See infra notes 161-84 and accompanying text.
150. United States v. Finance Comm. to Re-elect the President, 507 F.2d 1194, 1201 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
151. 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
152. Id. at 625-26.
153. Id. at 625.
154. Id. at 626.
155. Young Americans for Freedom, Inc. v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 728, 522 P.2d 189
(1974); N.J. State Chamber of Commerce v. N.J. Election Law Enforcement Comm'n, 82 N.J.
57,411 A.2d 168 (1980); Comm'n v. New York Temp. State Comm'n on Regulation of Lobby-
ing, 534 F. Supp. 489 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v. Finance Comm. to Re-elect the Presi-
dent, 507 F.2d 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (interpretation of federal law).
156. 761 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986).
157. Id. at 512. The Arkansas voters adopted a general ethics in government bill in 1988
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In a ballot question or referendum the people are in the same
position as the legislator considering how to vote on a bill. It is im-
portant for them to have as much information as possible so that they
can make an informed, intelligent choice. Like elected lawmakers,
voters may properly consider the "source and credibility of the advo-
cate."'' s8 Knowing the source of the communication is like knowing
the bias of a witness. 15 9 The voter can ask whether or not the infor-
mation being presented is only one side of a more complex issue.
Knowing who stands to gain and lose from a particular ballot ques-
tion can help a voter determine whether or not the speaker or the
advertisement is credible.
Referenda and ballot questions are the most direct expressions of
the popular will. They should be conducted in an open forum with
full debate.' 6° Narrow disclosures like the ones adopted by the Ar-
kansas General Assembly help promote full debate and informed
voter choices by allowing all of the issues, including the credibility of
the proponents or opponents of a measure, to be debated. As the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals said in Buckley,
[I]t would be ironic if First Amendment rights were extended
so as to prevent the kind of public awareness that is the overreach-
ing objective of the First Amendment.
Disclosure laws are predicated on the proposition that money
effectively used can influence voters and that the voters sought to
be influenced ought to know where the money is coming from, and
be able to take into account the social, economic, and political in-
terests of the contributor. It is pertinent to the political process, as
elsewhere in the marketplace of ideas, that meaningful competition
depends on openness.'
6 '
Only one court has struck down lobbyist registration laws. In
Montana Auto Association v. Greely 162 the Montana Supreme Court
struck down the state's law that required all lobbying groups to dis-
close each contribution and membership fee whether or not it was
paid for lobbying purposes. The court found that although disclo-
sures did not automatically render a law unconstitutional, they had to
which included lobbyist registration provisions. Initiated Measure 1 of 1988, codified at ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 27-8-401 to 803 (Supp. 1989) (lobbyist registration provision codified at ARK.
CODE ANN. § 21-8-601 (Supp. 1989)).
158. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978).
159. Messerli v. State, 626 P.2d 81, 87 (Alaska 1981).
160. Bemis Pentecostal Church v. State, 731 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1987).
161. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
162. 632 P.2d 300 (Mont. 1981).
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be related to an important governmental purpose. Nonlobbying-re-
lated contributions and fees were not sufficiently related to the impor-
tant government purpose of regulating lobbying. The court said that
"[u]nless a compelling interest exists, the State may not put a person
in the position of having to reveal or explain his associational ties."16
This statement is not intended to be as broad as it seems. Although it
is not entirely clear from the opinion, the court seemed to find the law
overbroad. Presumably, a narrowly tailored disclosure law which
limited disclosures to information relating specifically to lobbying
would be constitutional.
The Arkansas law does not have this problem. The law applies
to any group which collects or spends money to influence a ballot
question. The law limits the definitions of contributions and expendi-
tures to those activities undertaken "for the purpose of influencing the
qualification, passage, or defeat of a ballot question or the passage or
defeat of a legislative question."'" 4 This avoids the problem in the
Montana legislation because only the money collected and spent for
the purpose of the ballot question must be reported. This is directly
related to the governmental purpose of providing information to the
voters to allow the evaluation of ballot committee's speech and in-
trudes no more than is necessary upon speech rights to achieve that
purpose. 
65
VI. COMPELLED DISCLOSURE: ASSOCIATION
Statutes which require groups to disclose the names of their
members and contributors seriously infringe on the first amendment
right of association.' 66 In NAACP v. Alabama ' 61 the United States
163. Id. at 310.
164. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-402(3)(A) & (B), and (5) (Supp. 1989).
165. See also New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey Election Law En-
forcement Comm'n, 82 N.J. 57, 79, 411 A.2d 168, 179 (New Jersey Supreme Court narrowed
the construction of the term "to influence ... legislation" in a lobbyist registration law to
apply only to those people "whose direct, express, and intentional communications with legis-
lators for the purpose of affecting the outcome of legislation are undertaken on a substantial
basis.").
166. This right is rich and varied. Professor Tribe has outlined four categories of cases in
which a first amendment right to association has been asserted. They are (1) where the govern-
ment directly punishes the fact of membership, (2) where the government intrudes into the
internal organization of a group, (3) where the government withholds a privilege or benefit
from the members of a group, and (4) where the government compels disclosure of a group's
membership. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1015 (2d ed. 1988).
Tribe's fourth category of cases best fits the compelled disclosure of the Arkansas disclo-
sure statute. According to Tribe, this category is "in some respects the easiest and in others
the most difficult" because, while anonymity has long been recognized as an important first
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Supreme Court struck down a state law which would have required
the NAACP to reveal the names of its members to the state attorney
general. The state argued that its interest in eliminating subversives
within the NAACP justified the forced disclosure. The Court found
that the state interest was only loosely related to the disclosure and
was outweighed by the obvious danger to the group's members if their
association was revealed.
168
The Court described the right of association in this manner:
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, par-
ticularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group asso-
ciation, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking
upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly
.... Of course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be
advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious, or
cultural matters, and state action which may have the effect of cur-
tailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny. 
169
The Court applied this principle in a number of other cases to
strike down state disclosure laws which either were not supported by
substantial governmental interests or would harm the group or its
members.17° The forced revelation of financial matters also infringes
the right of association because "[flinancial transactions can reveal
much about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs."' 71 In
Bates v. City of Little Rock 172 the Court invalidated a city ordinance
that required groups to disclose lists of their dues, disbursements, and
members. 173
The right of association is not absolute. Presumably, a suffi-
ciently strong governmental interest will justify the compelled disclo-
sure of some information. In Buckley v. Valeo 7 4 the Court upheld
the requirements of a federal campaign law which required campaign
committees to disclose to the federal election commission the names
amendment value, secrecy often disguises dangerous operations. Id. at 1019. Compare Talley
v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
167. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 460-61.
170. DeGregory v. Attorney Gen. of N.H., 383 U.S. 825 (1966); Gibson v. Florida Legisla-
tive Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366
U.S. 293 (1961); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
171. California Banker's Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78-79 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
172. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
173. Id.
174. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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of their contributors and required individuals to reveal their contribu-
tions and expenditures on behalf of candidates. The Court admitted
that disclosure might deter some people from making contributions
but found that the purposes behind the law-deterring corruption,
providing information to enhance voter evaluation of a candidate, and
facilitating enforcement of the law-outweighed any adverse effect on
speech. 1
75
The Court distinguished NAACP v. Alabama because any harm
to the Buckley plaintiffs was speculative. The NAACP had "made an
uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of identity
of its rank-and-file members exposed these members to economic re-
prisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other
manifestations of public hostility."' 176 In Buckley, the plaintiffs relied
on "the clearly articulated fears of individuals, well experienced in the
political process,"'' 7 7 and the testimony of several minor-party officers
that a few people had refused to make contributions.
78
The Court rejected the argument that the first amendment re-
quired the law to make a blanket exception for minor parties. 7 9 A
definition of a minor party on the front end would only look to the
party's past or present strength and would ignore other important
considerations.' The critical factor is not the age or strength or suc-
cess of the party. Instead, the important question is whether or not
"disclosure will impinge upon protected associational activity."'8 1
Therefore, Buckley held that groups must be given the opportu-
nity to show that disclosure will harm their right of association. In-
stead of a blanket exemption,
[m]inor parties must be allowed sufficient flexibility in the proof of
injury to assure a fair consideration of their claim. The evidence
offered need show only a reasonable probability that the compelled
disclosure of a party's contributors' names will subject them to
threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials
or private parties. The proof may include, for example, specific
evidence of past or present harassment of members due to their
175. Id. at 68.
176. 357 U.S. at 462.
177. 424 U.S. at 71-72 (quoting Brief for Appellants at 173).
178. Id. at 72.
179. Id. See also 1980 Il. Socialist Workers Campaign v. State of Ill. Bd. of Elections, 531
F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ill. 1981) where a federal district court held that the failure to grant a state
agency the authority to exempt controversial groups from a campaign law's disclosure require-
ments was constitutional.
180. 424 U.S. at 72-73.
181. Id. at 73.
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associational ties, or of harassment directed against the organiza-
tion itself. A pattern of threats or specific manifestations of public
hostility may be sufficient. New parties that have no history upon
which to draw may be able to offer evidence of reprisals and threats
directed against individuals or organizations holding similar
views. "s
The Court later applied this test in Brown v. Socialist Workers '74
Campaign Committee (Ohio). 183 In Brown the Court held that the
provisions of an Ohio law which required every candidate to report
the names and addresses of campaign contributors and recipients of
disbursements could not be applied to the Socialist Workers Party.
The record showed that the party had a long history of both private
and public harassment 84 which more than satisfied the Buckley
test.185 The lower courts have consistently exempted the SWP from
numerous state and local disclosure requirements.
8 6
There is no doubt that the Arkansas act is constitutional on its
face in regard to any infringement of associational rights. A first
amendment violation requires more than an abstract speculation of
harm. Instead, any group seeking an exemption must show a reason-
able probability that they will be harmed by the disclosures. Buckley
forecloses any argument that the law must contain an automatic ex-
emption for minor parties or controversial groups.
On the other hand, the law is quite clear that any group which
can satisfy the Buckley requirements is entitled to an exemption. This
182. Id. at 74.
183. 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
184. Specific examples included threatening phone calls, hate mail, burning of party litera-
ture, destruction of party members' property, police harassment of a party candidate, firing of
party members, and massive FBI surveillance. Id. at 99.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., McArthur v. Smith, 716 F. Supp. 592 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (SWP mayoral candi-
date exempt from disclosure in nonpartisan election); 1980 I1. Socialist Workers Party v. State
of Ill. Bd. of Elections, 531 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (SWP exempt from state disclosure
laws); Wisconsin Socialist Workers 1976 Campaign Comm. v. McCann, 433 F. Supp. 540
(D.C. Wis. 1977). But see Oregon Socialist Workers 1974 Campaign Comm. v. Paulus, 432 F.
Supp. 1255 (D. Or. 1977) (SWP failed to show reasonable probability of harm).
Other courts have exempted the Communist Party. See FEC v. Hall-Tyner Campaign
Comm., 678 F.2d 416 (1982).
Courts have been more lenient when the government is investigating possible criminal
violations. In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 842 F.2d 1229 (1 1th Cir. 1988). The government
interest in clean elections outweighs any harm to the minor party. Caucus Distrib. v. Commis-
sioner of Commerce, 422 N.W.2d 264 (Minn. App. 1988). Other strong governmental inter-
ests will also prevail against an associational claim. See Attorney Gen. v. Irish N. Aid Comm.,
346 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 465 F.2d 1405 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1080 (1972).
To thwart disclosure a group must show that the investigation is proceeding in bad faith.
Federal Election Comm'n v. LaRouche Campaign, 644 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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is particularly important in ballot elections because the groups which
may coalesce for or against an issue may only exist for the duration of
the ballot election. They will rarely have a history or a track record.
Thus, they must show the probability of harassment by analogy to the
treatment of other groups on similar issues. The difficulty a group
may have doing this and the length of time it may take for a case to
work its way through the courts suggest that the law should be
amended. Specifically, the General Assembly should allow groups to
make an in camera presentation to an administrative officer, perhaps
the Secretary of State. If they can show the probability of harm, they
should receive an exemption from the disclosure requirements. Any
hearing or presentation should be informal with a relaxation of the
formal rules of evidence. The group should be allowed to appeal the
decision to the courts in an expedited proceeding.
This is not to say that the Constitution requires such an amend-
ment. In 1980 Socialist Workers Campaign v. State of Illinois Board
of ElectionsI87 a federal district court held that the first amendment
does not require a state to empower a state agency with the authority
to grant exemptions to campaign disclosure laws. The court found
that the limited additional burden of filing a court case instead of an
administrative proceeding did not unduly infringe on any first amend-
ment rights in light of the importance of the state interests and the
ultimate availability of judicial review.188
I agree with the court on the constitutional question. Neverthe-
less, prudence and good policy dictate that an administrative proceed-
ing be made available. This administrative exemption proceeding
would ensure that the delicate first amendment right of association
would not be fatally harmed by either delay or unnecessary harass-
ment. A more involved procedure would run the risk that the group
would wither while awaiting the outcome of its case. As the Second
Circuit pointed out,
[minority parties] rarely have a firm financial foundation. If appre-
hension is bred in the minds of contributors to fringe organizations
by fear that their support of an unpopular ideology will be re-
vealed, they may cease to provide financial assistance .... Society
suffers from such a consequence because the free flow of ideas, the
lifeblood of the body politic, is necessarily reduced.189
A quick, easy, and private administrative proceeding provides
187. 531 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
188. Id. at 922.
189. Federal Election Comm'n v. Hall-Tyner Campaign Comm., 678 F.2d 416, 420 (1982).
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the best balance of individual, group, and governmental interests.
Even if the balance tips slightly in favor of the group's interests, this is
not a bad result in a society dedicated to free discourse.
VII. VAGUENESS, OVERBREADTH, AND CHILLING EFFECT
The final issues to consider are (1) whether or not the Act is
vague or overbroad and (2) whether or not the Act's requirements
unduly chill protected speech. Specifically, we must look at whether
the definition of groups and activities covered by the Act is sufficiently
clear that reasonable people will know how to comply with the Act
and whether or not the additional structure and record-keeping will
prevent groups from engaging in protected speech.
In general, vagueness relates to the clarity of the statutory lan-
guage while overbreadth relates to its sweep.' 90 The danger is that
delicate first amendment freedoms will be lost by the excessive reach
of the law. Thus, overbreadth involving first amendment issues is an
exception to the general rule of standing because courts will allow a
challenge whether or not the challenger has engaged in protected
speech.1 91 Vague statutes, on the other hand, fail to provide enough
guidance so that reasonable people can conform their conduct to the
law. 192 The actual problem is either that the language of the law al-
lows protected speech to be brought within its ambit or that the lan-
guage is so unclear that an individual may not know the kind of
speech prohibited or regulated by the law. Courts often talk about
vagueness and overbreadth together because the effect on speech is the
same. 93 Both tend to suppress protected speech because the speaker
fears violating the law. Both require courts to engage in a searching
scrutiny of the law.
The plaintiffs in Buckley raised vagueness and overbreadth chal-
lenges to a provision of the federal law that required an individual
190. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967). The Court stated that a vague statute
defines itself "in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application." Id. at 249. On the other hand, an overbroad statute
uses "means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected free-
doms." Id. at 250.
Where conduct is also implicated by the state regulation the Court has required "substan-
tial overbreadth." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 630 (1973). Unlike overbreadth,
vagueness is not a unique first amendment doctrine. Rather, it arises out of the imperatives of
due process. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). Nevertheless, courts require
greater precision when dealing with protected speech. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
191. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1968).
192. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
193. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1967).
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who made contributions or expenditures over a certain amount to file
a statement with the Federal Election Commission. 94 "Contribu-
tions" and "expenditures" were defined as the use of money to "influ-
ence" a federal election. 95
The Court expressed its concern that the Act could come to en-
compass activities concerning issues discussion and "advocacy of a
political result."' 9 6 This problem reverberated throughout the Act
because the fundamental term "political committee" was defined in
terms of annual contributions and expenditures. 197 Lower courts had
previously limited the scope of political committees to cover only
those groups under the control of a candidate or whose major purpose
was the nomination or election of a candidate.' 9 This limitation
would not help an individual, however, who was engaged in solitary
activity. Therefore, the Court construed the Act to reach only money
used for activities "that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate." 99 So limited, the Act did not extend to
all partisan discussions but only to those activities expressly directed
to a particular election result.200 This was permissible because of the
Act's overall goal to increase the fund of information available to vot-
ers to evaluate candidates. The Act would reach not only the conven-
tional activities of national parties but also the election oriented
expenditures of individuals.
The language of the Arkansas Act presents almost the same is-
sue. Ballot and legislative question committees are defined by the ex-
penditures they make "for the purpose of attempting to influence"
ballot or legislative questions. 20 1 The terms "contributions" and "ex-
penditures" are similarly defined by reference to the purpose of influ-
encing ballot or legislative questions.20 2 In addition, like the Federal
Election Act, individuals who make expenditures outside of an organ-
ized committee must also file a report.20 3
As an initial matter, the Arkansas Act must be given the same
kind of limiting construction as the United States Supreme Court
gave the Federal Election Act. The Act must be limited to those con-
194. 424 U.S. at 74-75.
195. Id. at 77.
196. Id. at 79.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 80.
200. Id.
201. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-402(2), (7) (Supp. 1989).
202. Id. § 7-9-402(3), (5).
203. Id. § 7-9-406(b).
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tributions and expenditures which expressly advocate the election or




In the context of the federal law, express advocacy need not be limited
to the repetition of key phrases.2 "5 The speech must be considered as
a whole, and subjective intent alone will not be determinative.2 °6
Rather, a court must look at the effect, context, and import of the
speech and conclude that the words have no other reasonable mean-
ing than as an exhortation to vote for or against a particular
candidate.2 °7
Even with this limitation, however, the Act covers a whole range
of protected speech by groups and individuals under circumstances
which implicate other important first amendment values. Specifically,-
the express advocacy limitation still brings newspapers and churches
within the scope of the Act if they engage in activity directed toward a
specific ballot question. The act would still require churches and
newspapers to register when the church engages in first amendment
activity related to a ballot question or when the newspaper takes a
stand on a ballot question. The Act attempts to exempt churches but
it is not very successful in doing so. Section 7-9-402(4) states that
contributions and expenditures do not include "any communication
by a bona fide church or religious denomination to its own members
or adherents for the sole purpose of protecting the right to practice
the religious tenets of such church or religious denomination.
'20 8
This definition is unnecessarily limited. For example, suppose
the ballot contains a question concerning the regulation of abortion.
Abortion is a question of great concern to many churches whether or
not there is a related question on the ballot. If the church continues
its regular activities during the election season and also speaks out on
the morality of the ballot question, the church would be required to
file a report (and perhaps even register as a committee) because the
communication attempted to influence the passage of a ballot question
and was not solely to protect the right to practice the church's tenets.
That is, the ballot question did not threaten the right of the church to
engage in any particular religious practice. The church could con-
tinue to worship in its accustomed manner and to believe its tradi-
204. This formulation must be modified to also cover those contributions and expenditures
which expressly advocate the qualification or not of a legislative question.
205. Federal Election Comm'n v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
850 (1987), appeal after remand, 869 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1989).
206. Id. at 863.
207. Id. at 864.
208. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-402(4) (Supp. 1989).
1989-90]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
tional doctrine whether or not the ballot measure passed. Even the
last clause of the section would not help the church because people do
not pay to become members.2 °9
One can also imagine a conflict between a newspaper's editorial
stand on an issue and the Act. One or more editorials on a ballot
question could easily exceed the amount to bring the law into play.
Unless a newspaper's subscribers are considered its "paid members or
shareholders," the newspaper must file the required reports. Unlike
the federal campaign law, there is no "press exemption.
210
One solution might be to amend the law to expressly provide a
church and press exemption.21' This would provide in general that
the Act did not apply to the regular activities of a church but that ad
hoc activities expressly advocating a particular result on a ballot ques-
tion would require disclosure limited to the financing of that
advocacy.
Bemis Pentecostal Church v. State2 12 is an example of this ap-
proach. In Bemis the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the Tennes-
see Disclosure Act did not apply to the regular activities of a church
even if they advocated a particular election result.213 Although the
Tennessee Act expressly excluded this kind of activity from the Act's
coverage, the court suggested that the first amendment would also
dictate the same result. 214 Nevertheless, the court found that the law
did apply to special church activities expressly advocating the defeat
of the referendum in question.21 5 Unlike Bellotti, the Tennessee Act
did not completely prohibit an entire category of speech. Instead, it
imposed registration and disclosure requirements on direct attempts
to influence the ballot process. The court found implicit support for
209. Id. This section says, in part, that "contribution" shall not mean any communication
"by a person strictly with the person's paid members or shareholders." Id.
210. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (Supp. 1989).
211. See Bemis Pentecostal v. State, 731 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. 1987).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 905.
214. Id.
Plaintiffs' regular and continuing programs of broadcasting their religious serv-
ices on radio or television or of publishing and distributing church newsletters are
not and cannot be considered campaign contributions or expenditures, regardless of
whether they advocate a particular election result or not in the course of such activi-
ties, as these activities are protected by the First Amendment and are expressly ex-
cluded from the operation of the Act ....
Id.
215. Id. at 906.
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these kinds of requirements in several other supreme court cases. 2 16
The Tennessee court concluded:
As enacted, the Campaign Financial Disclosure Act does not
and cannot control the quality or content of speech; it does not
limit contributions or expenditures made during a campaign; it is
neutral in all respects as regards the groups to whom it applies and
the types of activities at which it is specifically aimed. The burden
placed on election campaign participants is graduated according to
the degree of financial involvement and the nature of the office; it
does not and cannot interfere with generalized debate or discus-
sions of public issues.... The organizational burdens imposed by
the Act are minimal, extending only slightly beyond the necessity
to appoint or designate a political treasurer, who could be the regu-
lar organizational treasurer, if any, serving in Plaintiffs' churches.
The burden of records-keeping is certainly no greater than that al-
ready imposed by other State and Federal laws with which
churches must comply.
2 17
There are some troubling aspects of this approach that the Ten-
nessee court did not discuss.218 Speech by religious groups implicates
both the speech and the religion clauses of the first amendment.
Thus, the United States Supreme Court has held that religious speech
is also protected by the first amendment and cannot be excluded from
a public forum because of its content.219 Moreover, the Court has
repeatedly struck down state statutes which excessively entangled
government and religion, in part because of the fear that government
regulation would stifle the free exercise of religion. 220 At the same
time, the courts have upheld the imposition of some regulatory rules
on secular church activities.
2
216. Id. (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), and Citizens Against Rent
Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981)).
217. 731 S.W.2d at 907.
218. I am indebted to my First Amendment Seminar students for these insights. In partic-
ular, Greg Wallace forcefully raised the question of religious speech and Andy Turner articu-
lated the approach I adopted in this article. Of course, much as I would like to blame them for
any flaws, I cannot. Any errors are mine.
219. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268-70 (1981).
220. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 410 (1985). Professor Tribe lists five first amend-
ment doctrines of which entanglement is a part. They are:, 1) where the governmental action
creates excessive administrative entanglement; 2) when the government turns over traditional
governmental powers to religion; 3) when the action breeds religiously based political divisive-
ness; 4) when enforcement of a rule would create excessive administrative entanglement; and
5) when court or governmental inquiry invades pervasively religious issues. L. TRIBE, Supra
note 165, at 1226-27. The Arkansas statute implicates the fourth and fifth doctrines.
221. See Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985)
(upheld the application of the Fair Labor Standard Act to religiously based secular activities).
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The Bemis approach seems to unduly entangle government and
religion. To enforce the distinction between a church's regular activi-
ties and its express advocacy, someone must examine the church's
doctrine, activities, services, literature, etc. This would require either
the church to keep detailed records or the government to diligently
investigate church activities. Discovering the line between regular
worship and ministry and express advocacy would require both Solo-
monic and Pharisaic wisdom.
The chilling effect on religious speech also must be considered.
Suppose during Sunday Mass the priest announces that a special col-
lection will be taken up to fund some advertising on a ballot question.
The law would require the church to keep records of its contributions
that Sunday for the purpose of possible disclosure. This will poten-
tially deter either the church from engaging in the campaign or pa-
rishioners from contributing to the collection.
If the overriding purpose of the law is to provide the voters infor-
mation to evaluate the speakers, then the law need not apply in those
instances when the identity of the speaker and its source of financing
are obvious. When a church speaks as a church everyone knows the
identity of the speaker and has sufficient general information to assess
the church's possible bias. There is no need for recordkeeping, which
only supports disclosure anyway, because there is no need for disclo-
sure. If a person wants to vote for or against a ballot question because
Catholics, Jews, or Muslims have taken a position on the issue, they
will be able to do so. Disclosing the amount the religious groups
spent and who in the congregation donated goes beyond the limited
purposes of disclosure.
On the other hand, if religious groups contribute money to in-
dependent ballot question committees, whether composed exclusively
of other religious groups or not, the independent committee must reg-
ister and disclose just like any other ballot committee. This would
insure that unscrupulous individuals would not use church-related
groups to skirt the disclosure rules. This solution may not guarantee
that the public will always know everyone who is behind a particular
committee. The disclosures should provide enough information so
that any suspicious activity will be noticed.
Newspapers, on the other hand, should be given a blanket ex-
emption along the lines of the one in the Federal Election Act.222 Af-
ter all, the business of a newspaper is to inform the public through its
news and editorials. Thus, its regular activities always include core
222. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (Supp. 1989).
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political speech. Moreover, when the newspaper takes an editorial
position, the public can evaluate the source of the opinion. There are
no secret speakers. Rather, the on-going editorial policy of the paper
will be known to its readers long before an editorial appears on a bal-
lot question. Readers will know, for example, if a newspaper takes a
liberal or a conservative position on government affairs and can con-
sider that when assessing the paper's editorial position on a ballot
question. Thus, compelled disclosure is not necessary as to newspa-
pers because the Act's purpose of allowing voters to evaluate speech
on ballot issues is accomplished by the nature of the newspaper
business.
The potential chilling effect of the disclosure requirements goes
beyond churches and newspapers. Ballot questions concern impor-
tant, often fundamental, issues for state and local governments. Un-
like candidate elections, where there are permanent national, state,
and local organizations, ballot elections often bring together groups of
citizens organized more or less for the sole purpose of speaking out in
favor of or against the question on the ballot. In addition, other
groups who exist for more general purposes, like education or recrea-
tion, may mobilize around a particular ballot question that effects
their interests. In other words, the Act still intrudes deeply on pro-
tected speech.
A fragmented United States Supreme Court addressed this issue
in Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life.2 2 3
The Massachusetts Committee For Life (MCFL) was incorporated as
a nonprofit corporation to "foster respect for human life." '224 To this
end, the group engaged in a variety of educational and legislative ac-
tivities. In September 1978 MCFL published a newsletter which
urged its readers to vote pro-life. The newsletter included a list of the
pro-life candidates running for office. The paper also included a
''scorecard" of the candidates' views on pro-life issues and a picture of
the thirteen candidates who scored 100%.
Following the election, a complaint was filed with the Federal
Election Commission charging that the group violated the Federal
Election Act by spending funds from the corporate treasury on behalf
of specific candidates. The Commission eventually filed a complaint
in the federal district court against MCFL.
223. 479 U.S. 238 (1986). See generally Boles, Regulating Newsletters Under the Federal
Election Laws and the First Amendment, 40 ARK. L. REV. 79 (1986).
224. 479 U.S. at 241 (quoting statement of corporate purpose contained in articles of incor-
poration of Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.).
1989-90]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's holding that the
Act covered MCFL's activities but was unconstitutional as applied.
A majority of the justices agreed that the Act, as applied, burdened
protected speech without a correspondingly strong state interest, but
could not agree on the rationale. Three justices joined the section of
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court where he found that the Act's
recordkeeping and disclosure requirements unduly burdened speech.
Although the additional requirements imposed on corporations could
be constitutionally applied in general, Brennan noted that the addi-
tional recordkeeping and disclosure requirements could serve as a dis-
incentive for small groups to engage in political speech. 225 The
recordkeeping would impose additional cost and complexity that
small groups could not afford. He elaborated by saying:
It is not unreasonable to suppose that, as in this case, an incorpo-
rated group of like-minded persons might seek donations to sup-
port the dissemination of their political ideas, and their occasional
endorsement of political candidates, by means of garage sales, bake
sales, and raffles. Such persons might well be turned away by the
prospect of complying with all the requirements imposed by the
Act. Faced with the need to assume a more sophisticated organi-
zational form, to adopt specific accounting procedures, to file peri-
odic detailed reports, and to monitor garage sales lest nonmembers
take a fancy to the merchandise on display, it would not be surpris-
ing if at least some groups decided that the contemplated political
activity was simply not worth it.
2 26
The practical effect of the statute was to burden and reduce protected
speech in a manner not supported by important governmental
interests.
Justice O'Connor provided the fifth vote to affirm the lower
court's ruling. She wrote separately, however, to underscore her con-
cern that the opinion not be seen as diluting Buckley's approval of
disclosure requirements. In her view, the significant burden on pro-
tected speech came "not from the disclosure requirements ...but
from the additional organizational restraints imposed upon" 227 the
group. These additional requirements did not further the govemmen-
225. Id. at 254. Justice Brennan was quick to point out that there is a difference between
the recordkeeping and disclosure's effect on contributors and on the protected speech of the
group itself. That is, while the government interests supported the Act's requirements even
though some people might choose not to contribute to political campaigns, it does not neces-
sarily follow that those same interests support the Act's requirements which deterred the ac-
tual political speech of organized groups. Id. at 254 n.7.
226. Id. at 255.
227. Id. at 266.
520 [Vol. 12:481
BALLOT QUESTION DISCLOSURE
tal interest in campaign disclosure. Furthermore, the.record did not
show that groups like MCFL posed any danger that would justify
limiting protected speech.22
The MCFL case quite clearly shows the Court's concern that the
quantity of core political speech not be unduly reduced by election
law requirements. Several of the federal law's requirements which
concerned the Court would also affect groups in Arkansas trying to
comply with the Ballot Disclosure Act.2 29
The larger problem addressed by the Court in Massachusetts Citi-
zens For Life cannot be solved by any limiting construction of the
Act's language or any amendment exempting certain groups without
also destroying the beneficial effect of disclosure in general. The Act
could try to define with particularity the kind of groups which would
be constitutionally exempt but, unfortunately, there will be groups
near whatever boundary the law draws. A court would still have to
consider an "as applied" challenge. The law could also raise the
threshold limit for triggering the law's coverage but this would de-
stroy the most beneficial aspect of the law, providing voters with the
information to evaluate positions on ballot questions. The higher the
threshold the easier it will be to evade the law's purpose.
To resolve these problems the Arkansas law should be amended
to provide for an administrative proceeding for small groups to seek
an exemption. Just like the proceeding where a controversial group
would seek to be exempted, a small group should have a fast, inexpen-
sive procedure available to it to show that the law's requirements un-
duly burden its ability to engage in protected speech. The group
should have to show that the law's specific mandates require such
changes or additions to its structure or such additional cost that its
ability to engage in protected speech will be significantly reduced or
eliminated. Such a procedure, with such an evidentiary showing, ade-
quately balances the state and the voters' interest in maximum disclo-
sure with the speakers' interest in exercising first amendment rights.
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that, for the most part, the Arkansas
228. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
229. For example, in Arkansas groups would have to maintain accurate records of most
contributions to know when the threshold amounts for both the individual contributor and the
group have been reached. They would have to appoint a person to act as the financial officer to
maintain the records, file the reports, and be available for inquiry, and they would have to
carefully monitor their fundraising efforts.
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Ballot Disclosure Act is constitutional. On its face, the law does not
violate the first amendment rights of speech or association. Suffi-
ciently important reasons justify the slight limitations imposed on
speech and associational rights. Some provisions of the law must be
given a particular reading, however, to comply with Supreme Court
cases. Finally, this Article recommends that the state provide infor-
mal administrative proceedings to allow controversial or grass roots
groups to seek exemptions from the disclosure requirements.
It could be, however, that the law and the first amendment will
have no effect on the problem of the influence of money on the ballot
process. The basic idea behind the law is to provide voters with infor-
mation about the source of ballot campaign advertisements so as not
to be misled by the information contained in them. The specific inci-
dent which seemingly prompted the law was the furor surrounding
the anonymous massive financing of the Committee Against Higher
Taxes. Yet the law as it is written may not cover that situation. The
Committee spent all of its money in the last five days of the campaign.
The law requires a disclosure no later than four days before the elec-
tion with a closing date seven days prior to the election. The backers
of the Committee could delay any contributions until six days prior to
the election, defeating the purpose of the law. Voters would not know
who was behind the campaign until thirty days after the election, too
late for that information to influence their vote.
To the extent that the Arkansas law provides information too
late to be useful, the General Assembly should consider requiring
some form of simultaneous disclosure of a group's financial back-
ers.23° On the other hand, the Arkansas media provided advance no-
tice of the Committee's media blitz, criticized its content, and
identified its likely backer. Nevertheless, the voters overwhelmingly
rejected Amendment 4. One wonders if simultaneous disclosure
would have made any difference. Supporters of simultaneous disclo-
sure and other campaign reforms come perilously close to asserting
that they know better than the people. They seem to be saying that if
only the people weren't so gullible, they would make better choices.
Thus, they seek to make it difficult for viewpoints opposed to their
own to influence the voters. If the first amendment teaches us any-
thing, it is that no group holds a monopoly on truth and that in the
long run it is best to trust the people.
230. Shockley, Direct Democracy, supra note 11, 417-18.
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